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19781 SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
In a broader context, the Martin decision may be interpreted
as a suggestion by the Court that the legislature reconsider the
viability of the statutory breach of warranty remedy in light of the
availability of a fully developed common-law action in strict prod-
ucts liability. It has been observed that "the warranty rationale of
strict liability for injury caused by defectively, though non-
negligently, manufactured products was merely temporary scaffold-
ing, useful in constructing the new tort, but to be dismantled once
the structure was complete." 4 Now that New York has expressly
approved the strict products liability remedy, there would appear
to be no need to retain an additional remedy within a statutory
scheme that was designed to govern commercial relationships. 5
Susan Kaufman
ARTICLE 32-ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3211: Court of Appeals modifies showing necessary to gain
dismissal for failure to state a cause of action
Upon the hearing of a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action,36 section 3211(c) permits either
LumiLrry § 16A[5][g] (1975), wherein the authors suggest that the Goldberg Court's use of
warranty language rather than tort concepts had an influence on the Mendel Court's decision.
Finally, in Micallef v. Miehle, 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976),
the Court reaffirmed its position by stating that a cause of action for breach of implied
warranty "based on tortious behavior, is more correctly treated under the theory of strict
products liability." Id. at 387, 348 N.E.2d at 578-79, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 122 (citation omitted).
" Gegan, supra note 1, at 64.
" While the breach of warranty remedy and the tort remedy appeared superficially
compatible, their underlying theoretical inconsistencies led to anomalous and sometimes
illogical results. See Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207,
305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969), overruled in Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395,
335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975).
CPLR 3211(a)(7) provides: "A party may move for judgment dismissing one or more
causes of action asserted against him on the ground that . the pleading fails to state a
cause of action . . . ." A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR
3211(a)(7) ordinarily is made before the answer is filed. CPLR 3211, commentary at 33
(McKinney 1970). The motion may be used simply to test the legal sufficiency of the plead-
ing. Alternatively, the movant may use extrinsic material to attack the factual bases of the
complaint. Id. at 30. The use of evidentiary matter in support of the motion, however, was
drastically limited in Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., 40 N.Y.2d 633, 357 N.E.2d 970, 389
N.Y.S.2d 314 (1976) (per curiam); see note 39 infra.
In opposition to the motion the plaintiff should request leave to replead in the event of
dismissal. See CPLR 3211(e). In addition, the plaintiff should submit or the court may require
evidence in support of a new or amended pleading in order to satisfy the court that there are
sufficient grounds to support a new cause of action if the present one is dismissed. See id.
Finally, the court may "treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment" after adequate
notice to the parties. CPLR 3211(c). This discretionary conversion can be utilized when the
record on the motion to dismiss is "as complete as it would be on an outright motion for
summary judgment.. . ." CPLR 3211, commentary at 48 (McKinney 1970). It should be
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party to the suit to offer "any evidence that could properly be con-
sidered on a motion for summary judgment."3 In Rovello v. Orofino
Realty Co.,38 the Court of Appeals adopted a narrow view of this
provision and held that the use of evidence so offered is limited to
curing defects in the pleadings or conclusively establishing that no
cause of action exists. 3 Recently, however, in Guggenheimer v.
Ginzberg,40 the Court retreated from this position and indicated
that, upon the hearing of a motion to dismiss, the Court may exam-
ine extrinsic evidence for the broader purpose of determining
whether the facts alleged to establish the existence of a cause of
action are "negated beyond substantial question."4 '
The Guggenheimer plaintiff, the Commissioner of the Depart-
ment of Consumer Affairs for the City of New York, sought a perma-
nent injunction against the defendant's allegedly deceptive adver-
tising practices.4 2 The complaint contained four causes of action
averring various violations of the Consumer Protection Law of
1969.13 The plaintiff also moved for a preliminary injunction" re-
noted that, even where the motion is not converted to one for summary judgment, a dismissal
after the court has examined evidentiary material may result in the order being deemed an
adjudication on the merits of the claim. See D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 276 (1978).
CPLR 3211(c).
40 N.Y.2d 633, 357 N.E.2d 970, 389 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1976) (per curiam).
" Id. at 636, 357 N.E.2d at 972, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 316. In adopting a restrictive test for
granting a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the Rovello Court gave considerable
weight to the effect of a 1973 amendment to CPLR 3211(c) which requires that notice be given
the parties before a motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for summary judgment. Since
the plaintiff confronted with an unconverted CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss is not enti-
tled to similar notice, the Rovello Court reasoned that dismissal on the merits under such
circumstances should be limited to rare situations. 40 N.Y.2d at 635, 357 N.E.2d at 972, 389
N.Y.S.2d at 316. The dissent, however, observed that CPLR 3211(a)(7) was intended to
enable the Court to ascertain whether a cause of action, in addition to being stated in the
pleadings, exists in fact. 40 N.Y.2d at 636, 357 N.E.2d at 974, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 318 (Wachtler,
J., dissenting). For a discussion of the Rovello decision, see The Survey, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv.
632, 642 (1977), in which the majority view is criticized as ignoring the plain language and
intended application of CPLR 3211(c). Professor Siegel also has criticized the Rovello holding
as a return to the common-law demurrer. CPLR 3211, commentary at 9-10 (McKinney Supp.
1977-1978). Dean McLaughlin, however, has suggested that the Rovello holding has little
practical significance, since a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion can be converted readily to a motion
for summary judgment if it appears that the plaintiff has no cause of action. See note 36
supra. Once the motion is converted and proper notice is given to the parties, all evidentiary
material may then be considered by the court. McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 14, 1977, at 4, col. 2.
40 43 N.Y.2d 268, 372 N.E.2d 17, 401 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1977), rev'g 53 App. Div. 2d 513, 384
N.Y.S.2d 162 (1st Dep't 1976) (mem.).
' 43 N.Y.2d at 275, 372 N.E.2d at 20-21, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
4" Id: at 271, 372 N.E.2d at 18, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 64, tit. A (1969). The defendant was doing business
as "The Webster's Dictionary Company" and was advertising that his mail order company
was selling authentic Webster's dictionaries at an unprecedented price, $20 below list. 43
N.Y.2d at 271, 372 N.E.2d at 18, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 183. The Commissioner alleged, inter alia,
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straining the defendant from advertising during the pendency of the
action. Both parties submitted affidavits on this motion.45 The trial
court denied the plaintiff's motion and, on its own initiative, dis-
missed the claim for failure to state a cause of action." The Appel-
late Division, First Department, affirmed, noting that although the
plaintiff arguably had stated a cause of action, there was little
chance of success on the merits.47
On appeal, Judge Cooke, writing for a unanimous Court, re-
viewed the allegations and concluded that the plaintiff had suffi-
ciently stated all four causes of action." Significantly, however, the
Court went on to examine the affidavits in order to determine
that the defendant's claim of authenticity was false and that the dictionary never actually
had been sold at the claimed list price. Id.
11 43 N.Y.2d at 271, 372 N.E.2d at 18, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
"Id. at 275, 372 N.E.2d at 21, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 186. A motion for a preliminary injunction
requires the petitioner to "show, by affidavit and such other evidence as may be submitted,
that there is a cause of action . . . ... CPLR 6312(a). The motion opens the record and
permits the court to determine whether the underlying complaint is legally sufficient. 43
N.Y.2d at 272, 372 N.E.2d at 19, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 183 (citing Shapiro v. City of New York,
67 Misc. 2d 1021, 1028, 325 N.Y.S.2d 787, 794 (1971), affl'd, 32 N.Y.2d 96, 296 N.E.2d 230,
343 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1973); Leonard v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 118 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171,
aff'd mem., 281 App. Div. 859, 119 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1st Dep't 1953); Challenger v. Household
Fin. Corp., 179 Misc. 966, 40 N.Y.S.2d 465, aff'd mem., 266 App. Div. 244, 43 N.Y.S.2d 517
(1st Dep't 1943)). It was apparently this procedural rule that prompted the Guggenheimer
trial court to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint even in the absence of a CPLR 3211(a)(7)
motion by the defendant. 43 N.Y.2d at 272, 372 N.E.2d at 19, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
"1 43 N.Y.2d at 271, 372 N.E.2d at 18, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 183. While the courts have
required a showing of a clear right to relief in order to avoid dismissal of a motion for a
preliminary injunction, see Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720,
190 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959), in determining whether the underlying complaint should be dis-
missed, the criteria for using evidentiary material prescribed in CPLR 3211(c) should be
adhered to. Under the decision in Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., 40 N.Y.2d 633, 357 N.E.2d
970, 389 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1976) (per curiam), dismissal under such circumstances would not be
granted unless the evidence conclusively negated the facts essential to the cause of action.
See id. at 636, 357 N.E.2d at 972, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 316. Thus, in applying both standards it
is possible for a plaintiff to be denied preliminary injunctive relief and yet be permitted to
pursue the underlying claim because the essential facts are not conclusively negated. A
similar result could be reached even under the more flexible Guggenheimer standard for
dismissing a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7), i.e., a dismissal may be granted where
the essential facts are negated beyond substantial question. See 43 N.Y.2d at 275, 372 N.E.2d
at 21, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
53 App. Div. 2d 513, 514, 384 N.Y.S.2d 162, 163 (1st Dep't 1976) (mem.).
43 N.Y.2d at 271-74, 372 N.E.2d at 19-21, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 183-86. Prior to examining
the legal sufficiency of the complaint itself, the Court noted that CPLR 3211(c) permits a
motion to dismiss to be converted to one for summary judgment, even before issue is joined,
provided adequate notice is given to the parties. Id. at 272, 372 N.E.2d at 19, 401 N.Y.S.2d
at 183-84. Since no such notice was given in Guggenheimer, the Court, citing Rovello, stated
that "there could be no conversion to a summary judgment motion, even on the court's
.initiative, and the affidavits were received for a limited purpose only, a purpose unconnected
with summary judgment. . . ." Id. at 272, 372 N.E.2d at 19, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 184. The Court
concluded that "the proper focus is on whether the complaint states a cause of action." Id.
1978]
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whether the plaintiff in fact had those causes of action.49 Eviden-
tiary matter was utilized to determine whether "a material fact as
claimed by the pleader to be one [was] not a fact at all" or whether
"it [could] be said that no significant dispute [existed] regarding
[that fact]."5 Applying' this analysis to the affidavits before the
Court, Judge Cooke held that the essential facts had not been
"negated beyond substantial question. ' 51 The complaint was there-
fore reinstated, although the lower court's denial of a preliminary
injunction was upheld.2
In contrast to Rovello, the affidavits in Guggenheimer were not
examined by the Court to determine whether they "[established]
conclusively that plaintiff [had] no cause of action."53 Rather, the
Court stated that dismissal may be granted if the affidavits demon-
strate beyond substantial question that the plaintiff has no cause
of action." Consequently, where affidavits are submitted with re-
spect to a CPLR 3211(a) (7) motion, the Guggenheimer Court's stan-
dard substantially reduces the showing necessary to gain dismissal.
Thus, without explicitly distinguishing Rovello, the decision ap-
pears to have significantly modified the restrictions on a court's
authority to rely on extrinsic material in determining whether to
dismiss a cause of action.55
It is submitted that the Guggenheimer Court's approach closely
43 N.Y.2d at 274-75, 372 N.E.2d at 20-21, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 185-86. In support of its
position that the affidavits could be used to determine whether a cause of action existed, the
Court relied on Rappaport v. International Playtex Corp., 43 App. Div. 2d 393, 352 N.Y.S.2d
241 (3d Dep't 1974); 4 WK&M 3211.36; and CPLR 3211, commentary at 31 (McKinney
1970). These authorities suggest that under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the movant is permitted to
establish that a material fact on which the claim relies is not a fact at all or that there is no
significant dispute as to the non-existence of the fact. It is this aspect of the CPLR 3211(a)(7)
motion that the Rovello decision appeared to have all but destroyed. See CPLR 3211, com-
mentary at 9 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978); note 39 and accompanying text supra.
0 43 N.Y.2d at 275, 372 N.E.2d at 20-21, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
5, Id., 372 N.E.2d at 21, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 186. The Court cited Kelly v. Bank of Buffalo,
32 App. Div. 2d 875, 302 N.Y.S.2d 60 (4th Dep't 1969) (mem.), as support for the requirement
that the essential facts be negated "beyond substantial question." In Kelly the extrinsic
material submitted on the motion to dismiss was sufficient to create a question of fact to be
properly determined at trial. Id.
52 43 N.Y.2d at 275, 372 N.E.2d at 21, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
40 N.Y.2d at 636, 357 N.E.2d at 972, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 316 (emphasis added).
, 43 N.Y.2d at 275, 372 N.E.2d at 21, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
In his Rovello dissent, Judge Wachtler criticized the majority's decision finding that
under the Court's standard it would be an "empty exercise" for a defendant to submit
evidence pursuant to CPLR 3211(c). 40 N.Y.2d at 638, 357 N.E.2d at 974, 389 N.Y.S.2d at
318 (Wachtler, J., dissenting). He argued that dismissal should result whenever a defendant
can clearly show the absence of an essential element of the cause of action. Id. at 636, 357
N.E.2d at 973, 389 N.Y.S. 2d at 317 (Wachtler, J., dissenting). The standard enunciated in
Guggenheimer, therefore, should give courts the flexibility urged by Judge Wachtler and
provide them with the authority to dismiss a cause of action where extrinsic evidence indi-
cates that a claim has no merit.
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approximates the intended application of CPLR 3211(c) and is
therefore more consistent with modern pleading rules than Rovello.
The legislative history indicates that a motion to dismiss pursuant
to CPLR 3211 was intended to be "in essence one for summary
judgment"5 permitting an inquiry into the factual basis of the alle-
gations." The original draft of CPLR 3211 did not provide for a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. This omission
reflected the intention of the framers to eliminate the abuses of
technical fact-pleading rules in favor of a more informal system of
notice pleading." CPLR 3211(a) (7) was inserted in the final draft as
part of a compromise measure which permitted such motions but
required that, in the event of dismissal, leave to replead be granted
only upon an adequate evidentiary showing that a cause of action
actually existed. 9 Although this provision ultimately was modified
to give the courts discretion in requiring extrinsic material,"° the
clear intent of the drafters was to minimize dilatory practices and
encourage early examination of the factual merits of the claim.
Revitalizing CPLR 3211 as a "speaking motion"6' was a position
" FIRST REP. 85. The legislative history also indicates that CPLR 3211(c), which applies
to all pre-answer motions under CPLR 3211(a), "allows a motion preliminary to answer, with
or without supporting proof. . . ." Id. at 83.
11 See CPLR 3212, commentary at 424 (McKinney 1970).
I FINAL REP. A465; 4 WK&M 3211.30, at 32-100. Those who opposed retention of a
motion to dismiss for legal insufficiency were primarily concerned with unnecessary delays
resulting from the practice of dismissing defective complaints and liberally granting leave to
replead. In addition, a national trend existed to replace fact pleading with notice pleading.
Korn & Paley, Survey of Summary Judgment, Judgment on the Pleadings and Related Pre-
Trial Procedures, 42 CoRNsU L.Q. 483, 493-96 (1957). Support for retention of the motion
came primarily from the various state bar associations which argued that the inability to have
defective pleadings dismissed before responsive pleadings were made would force the movant
to disclose evidentiary material prematurely. New York State Bar Ass'n, Report of the Joint
Committee on the Civil Practice Act 10 (Dec. 31, 1959).
1' The compromise measure was designed to reconcile opposing views on the desirability
of the motion to dismiss for legal sufficiency. See note 58 supra. The motion was retained
through the insertion of CPLR 3211(a)(7); but the availability of leave to replead was cur-
tailed by the additional provisions in subdivision (e), which required the party opposing the
motion to submit extrinsic material establishing a cause of action in order to obtain leave to
resubmit the complaint. 4 WK&M 3211.31, at 32-102 to -103. See Jon't BAR AsS'Ns COMM.,
Civm PRAcTicE ACr REPORT, reprinted in [1960] N.Y. Laws 2073, 2082-83; FibNAL REP. 85.
0 4 WK&M 3211.31, at 32-102 to -103. Unless required by the court, CPLR 3211(e) no
longer mandates that extrinsic evidence be produced in support of a request for leave to
replead. By virtue of the 1965 amendment, the movant is now given the option of either
submitting such proof or relying on his pleadings. See CPLR 3211(e).
1, A "speaking motion" is one based on the evidence submitted in addition to the plead-
ings. 4 WK&M 3211.35. Prior to Rovello, New York courts treated a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action as a "speaking motion." See, e.g., Rapoport v. Schneider,
29 N.Y.2d 396, 278 N.E.2d 642, 328 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1972); Rappaport v. International Playtex
Corp., 43 App. Div. 2d 393, 352 N.Y.S.2d 241 (3d Dep't 1974); Kelly v. Bank of Buffalo, 32
App. Div. 2d 875, 302 N.Y.S.2d 60 (4th Dep't 1969) (mem.).
1978]
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urged by the commentators after Rovello had, in effect, "relegated
it to its common law demurrer equivalent. ' 2 The language utilized
by the Guggenheimer Court, coupled with the legislative back-
ground of this section, furnishes ample support for this position. 3
Yet, by purporting to follow Rovello4 while actually applying a more
flexible standard, the Court has introduced some uncertainty into
this important area of civil practice. It is suggested that in future
cases the Court of Appeals seek to clarify its position on the appli-
cation of CPLR 3211(c) by articulating clear standards governing
the use of extrinsic material in pre-answer proceedings.
William T. Miller
ARTICLE 54-ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
CPLR 5401: Fourth department refutes competence of foreign
decree to directly affect New York realty
Designed to promote national unity, 5 the full faith and credit
82 CPLR 3211, commentary at 9 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978); see Rovello v. Orfino
Realty Co., 40 N.Y.2d 633, 636, 357 N.E.2d 970, 973, 389 N.Y.S.2d 314, 317 (1976) (Wachtler,
J., dissenting); The Survey, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 632, 642 (1977).
13 Additional support for the flexible approach approved in Guggenheimer can be found
in Rapoport v. Schneider, 29 N.Y.2d 396, 401, 278 N.E.2d 642, 645, 328 N.Y.S.2d 431, 436
(1972), a pre-Rovello decision, which permitted the use of affidavits upon the hearing of a
motion to dismiss for legal insufficiency. But see Gerber v. New York City Hous. Auth., 42
N.Y.2d 162, 366 N.E.2d 268, 397 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1977). In Gerber, the Court dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint because the extrinsic facts left "no other conclusion" than that the
plaintiff had no cause of action. Id. at 167, 366 N.E.2d at 271, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 611. This
language would appear to bring Gerber within the rigid Rovello exception permitting the use
of affidavits only where they conclusively negate the cause of action. But see id. (Fuchsberg,
J., dissenting).
14 See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
61 Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 584 (1951); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355
(1948); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943); Porter v. Wilson, 419 F.2d
254, 259 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1020 (1970). One commentary-has indicated
that the full faith and credit doctrine is aimed at providing "the benefits of a unified nation
by altering the status of otherwise 'independent, sovereign states."' Reese & Johnson, The
Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. Rav. 153, 161 (1949) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter cited as Reese & Johnson] (quoting Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343,
355 (1948)). Since the underlying policy is the promotion of national unity, the courts should
apply federal law in determining whether one state must afford full faith and credit to another
state's judgment. Reese & Johnson, supra, at 161-62.
Because of the requirement "that the judgment of a state court should have the same
credit, validity, and effect in every other court in the United States, which it had in the State
where it was pronounced," Hampton v. McConnel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 235 (1818) (Mar-
shall, C.J.), quoted in Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 236 (1908) (Holmes, J.), the full faith
and credit clause extends nationwide res judicata effect to a state court's judgment. Since a
final judgment in a state court usually would be conclusive on the parties and unimpeachable
in subsequent proceedings within that state, full faith and credit mandates that all other
